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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and Rule  
54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  The district court properly 
exercised its broad discretion to certify counts 2 through 4 for appeal, while 
withholding jurisdiction of count 1 which is governed by this Court’s decision in 
Thomas More Law Center, et al. v. Obama, Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, -
-- F.3d ---, 2011 WL 2556039 (June 29, 2011).  The court appropriately concluded 
that prompt appeal best suited the litigation.  Even were appeal of Counts 2 
through 4 improper under Rule 54(b), the district court entered final judgment on 
Plaintiffs’ Count 1 two days after this Court’s Thomas More decision, doing so on 
July 1, 2011.  The case is thus closed at the district court level.  If this court rejects 
appellate jurisdiction, the same appeal would come immediately before this court 
as a matter of right. 
The PPACA is unconstitutional because it compels those subject to its 
individual mandate, including the individual named Plaintiffs, to associate with 
private insurance companies and purchase private insurance, 26 U.S.C. § 
5000A(a), in violation of their constitutional liberty rights, including the right to 
refuse medical care, the freedom of intimate and expressive association, and the 
right of privacy in medical information.   
 1
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The minimum coverage provision imposes a penalty on those citizens who 
refuse medical care covered by PPACA-qualified insurance policies by forcing 
those citizens to pay for that care nonetheless.  See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a)-(f).  That 
burden on the right, no less than an absolute ban of the right, is unconstitutional.  
See U.S. Const. Amend. I, V.  The penalty burdens exercise of the fundamental 
liberty right to refuse medical care, imposing upon the exercise of that rightan 
economic cost.     
Under the PPACA, citizens also face penalties under 26 U.S.C. § 5000A for 
choosing practitioners who offer treatments not covered by PPACA-qualified 
insurance policies.  Plaintiffs are also forced to divulge their medical confidences 
to private health insurers who offer PPACA-qualified plans.  The PPACA thus 
employs coercion, penalizing with financial burden those who would prefer to 
obtain treatments not covered by PPACA-qualified insurance policies and forcing 
intimate associations with private insurers against the will of those who wish not to 
be insured and to pay out of pocket for their medical care.  That coercion violates 
the freedoms of expressive and intimate association, including the freedom not to 
associate.   
Finally, the PPACA requires disclosure of confidential medical information 
to private insurers (information essential to the operation of health insurance 
companies).  The Act does nothing to prevent disclosure of that information.  The 
 2
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Defendants offer no basis to conclude that disclosure of medical information is not 
required under the PPACA’s reforms, and, in fact, insurance company compliance 
with the reforms (particularly in ascertaining who is an insured at high risk for 
possible transference to an exchange) requires investigation of the insureds 
medical history.  See DiStefano Affidavit at ¶¶ 7-9, 10 (R.E. 50-7); Report of Dr. 
Joanna M. Shepherd-Bailey at 16-18 (R.E. 50-2).  The Appellees (hereinafter “the 
Secretary” or “Sebelius”) admit that the PPACA could operate in the same fashion 
without disclosure of medical information, suggesting an absence of any state 
interest in compelling disclosure, see Appellees’ Br. at 22-23, yet the PPACA 
allows and, as a practical matter, requires insurers to ascertain that information to 
identify high risk patients eligible for under the reinsurance programs.  See Report 
of Dr. Joanna M. Shepherd-Bailey at 16-18 (R.E. 50-2); 42 U.S.C.  § 18061.  
Therefore, the Plaintiffs’ interest in maintaining privacy outweighs the 
government’s admitted non-interest, and the PPACA violates Plaintiffs’ right to 
privacy. 
 
ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
 
I. APPELLATE JURISDICTION IS PROPER 
 Secretary Sebelius, et al. ask this Court to reject appellate jurisdiction under 
the District Court’s Rule 54(b) certification.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).  See R.E. 
82.  On February 28, 2011, the District Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ individual 
 3
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liberty claims 2, 3, and 4, but retained jurisdiction on claim 1 which concerned 
whether Congress had authority to enact the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (“PPACA”) under the Commerce Clause.  The Court appropriately 
exercised its discretion and determined that certification of counts 2, 3, and 4 for 
appeal was justified to preserve the plaintiffs’ right to a prompt appeal.  See 
Corrosioneering v. Thyssen Envtl. Sys., 807 F.2d 1279, 1282-83 (6th Cir. 1986).   
 When Appellants filed their notice of appeal, the parties had pending before 
the District Court cross-motions for summary judgment concerning whether 
Congress had authority under Article I to enact the PPACA’s individual mandate.  
That same issue was before this Court in Thomas More Law Center, et al. v. 
Barack Hussein Obama, et al., No. 10-2388 (June 29, 2011).  The District Court 
“question[ed] the relevance of any ruling it may make regarding the Commerce 
Clause issue given the more advanced stage of challenges to the Act in other 
jurisdictions and the ultimate impact of the appellate rulings in those cases on the 
instant case.”  R.E. 82, at 3.   
Absent actual prejudice to a litigant, the Court has discretion to control and 
manage its docket.  See FENF, LLC v. Healio Health Inc., Slip Copy, 2011 WL 
3489109, at *1 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (quoting In re Air Crash Disaster, 86 F.3d 498, 
516 (6th Cir. 1996)).  This Court reviews the District Court’s exercise of that 
 4
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discretion under an “abuse of discretion” standard.  See Corrosioning, 807 F.2d at 
1282-83; Pittman v. Franklin, 282 Fed. Apps. 418, 430 (6th Cir. 2008).   
 The District Court properly exercised its discretion and the Secretary has not 
met her burden to show otherwise.  Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure was intended to “strike a balance between the undesirability of 
piecemeal appeals and the need for making review available at a time that best 
serves the needs of the parties.”  Corrosioneering, 807 F.2d at 1282.  Thus, the 
“district court acts as a ‘dispatcher’ and is permitted to determine, in the first 
instance, the appropriate time when each final decision is ready for appeal.”  Id. 
(collecting cases).  The underlying policy is to prevent piecemeal appeals, not erect 
rigid rules that preclude immediate appeal despite the equities.  See Curtiss-Wright 
Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1980) (explaining that final judgments 
may be immediately appealable if they are “in some sense separable from the 
remaining unresolved claims”).  The district court must proceed “in the interest of 
sound judicial administration.”  Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 
437-38 (1956). 
 The district court dismissed plaintiffs’ counts 2, 3, and 4 on November 22, 
2010.  See R.E. 58.  In his final order, Judge David Dowd explained that “the 
dismissed claims are entirely separate from the single remaining claim.”  R.E. 82, 
at 2.  He continued, “[t]he nature of the constitutional challenges in Claims 2, 3, 
 5
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and 4 are independent from the constitutional challenge of Count 1, so the 
appellate court will not likely face the same issue a second time in the future.”  Id. 
at 2-3 (explaining that “the litigants are best served by allowing an immediate 
appeal of the Court’s dismissal of Counts 2, 3, and 4 given the uncertainty of the 
time period in which the constitutionality of the Act relative to the Commerce 
Clause will be determined in the federal courts”).   
 Counts 2, 3, and 4 were distinct from Count 1.  In Counts 2, 3, and 4, the 
plaintiffs alleged violations of their individual liberty rights protected under the 
United States Constitution.  While those counts share common issues of law, 
Congress’s authority under Article I was a legally distinct challenge, pled in the 
alternative to Counts 2 through 4.  Count 1 concerns whether Congress had the 
constitutional authority to act ab initio under the Commerce Clause.  The 
remaining counts address whether the individual mandate, assuming its 
constitutionality under Article I, imposes an unconstitutional burden on the 
individual Plaintiffs’ liberty, association, and privacy rights.  Count 1 asks whether 
Congress had power to act; Counts 2 through 4 ask whether the power to act is 
applied unconstitutionally to the individual Plaintiffs.  The individual liberty 
claims were not argued before the Court in the Thomas More decision.  See 
Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, --- F.3d ---, 2011 WL 2556039 (June 29, 
 6
Case: 11-3327     Document: 006111016927     Filed: 07/18/2011     Page: 11
2011).  Thus, while the Thomas More decision governed Count 1, plaintiffs 
remaining claims were unaffected by Thomas More.   
By certifying Counts 2 through 4, Judge Dowd appropriately balanced the 
judicial economies in this case.  He abstained from a decision on Count 1 until 
receiving guidance from this Court in Thomas More, yet he permitted an 
immediate appeal of Counts 2 through 4 to prevent undue delay of appellate claims 
that would reach this Court regardless of the outcome in Thomas More.  The 
Court’s certification, therefore, struck “a balance between the undesirability of 
more than one appeal in a single action and the need for making review available 
in multiple-party or multiple claim situations at a time that best serves the need of 
the litigation.”  R.E. 82, at 2 (quoting Good v. Ohio Edison, 104 F.2d 93, 95 (6th 
Cir. 1997)).   
 Even if the District Court’s certification was improper, the Secretary’s 
concerns are mooted by the District Court’s final order and judgment on Count 1 
entered July 1, 2011.  See R.E. 90, 91.  On June 29, 2011, this Court published its 
opinion in Thomas More, holding that “the minimum coverage provision is a valid 
exercise of the legislative power by Congress under the Commerce Clause.”  
Thomas More, 2011 WL 2556039, a *1.  Two days later, on July 1, 2011, the 
District Court entered final judgment.  See Order, R.E. 90 (finding that the “Court 
is bound by the Sixth Circuit’s majority ruling in Thomas More” and, so, “the 
 7
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Court grants defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Count 1 of the 
plaintiffs’ second amended complaint”).  Nothing remains pending at the district 
court level.  The issues before this Court on Counts 2 through 4 are fully briefed.  
A decision by this Court denying appellate jurisdiction would waste time and 
expense, as this appeal would return as of right under Rule 4 of the Federal Rules 
of Appellate Procedure.   
 The district court’s Rule 54(b) certification was appropriate.  Even if 
certification was improper, this Court should exercise appellate jurisdiction in the 
interests of justice and judicial economy. 
 
II. THE MINIMUM COVERAGE PROVISION VIOLATES THE 
PLAINTIFFS’ CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO LIBERTY, 
ASSOCIATION, AND PRIVACY 
 
 Congress for the first time in American history has compelled  citizens to 
purchase a private good or service, to wit, private health insurance.  See Jennifer 
Staman & Cynthia Brougher, Requiring Individuals to Obtain Health Insurance:  
A Constitutional Analysis, Cong. Res. Serv., at 3 (July 24, 2009). 1  The third-party 
health insurance model is well-defined by customs and practices, many of which 
are unaffected by the PPACA.  The compulsory relationship with health insurance 
companies forces citizens to suffer natural and foreseeable consequences of that 
                                                 
1 R.E. 69-6. 
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relationship.  Those consequences are not conjectural or speculative.  It was 
incumbent upon Congress to alter health insurance customs and practices, if it 
wished to liberate those it compels to be insured from those very customs and 
practices.  To the extent that it left those customs and practices unchanged, it bears 
the burden of proving them lawful.  Health insurance is traditional medical care 
paid forward.  A compulsory relationship with insurance companies affects all who 
would contract for health insurance, whether or not the individual accepts or 
desires coverage.  Whether a citizen would choose health insurance is of no 
moment.  The PPACA violates all citizens’ liberty rights because it deprives them 
of that freedom of choice. 
A. The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment, or Payment for 
Treatment Refused, Is a Fundamental Right  
 
 The Secretary accepts that the right “to refuse unwanted medical service” is 
a protected right.  See Appellees’ Brief, at 16 (citing Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep’t 
of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)).  “The principle that a competent person has a 
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment 
may be inferred from [] prior decisions.”  Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278.  The Secretary 
does not dispute that the right of refusal is fundamental.  Rather, the Secretary 
claims that the PPACA’s minimum coverage provision “in no way implicates this 
fundamental right to refuse unwanted medical care” because “the provision will 
not require that people obtain medical services of any  kind.”  Appellees’ Br. at 16.  
 9
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According to the Secretary, “individuals will still be able to determine whether to 
obtain medical care, what care to obtain, when, and from whom.”  Id.  In short, the 
Secretary argues that the PPACA interferes only “with economic freedom by 
requiring [citizens] to pay for insurance or tax penalties.”  Id. at 17.   
 The argument is myopic and misplaced.  The freedom in issue is not an 
economic liberty but a political liberty (the freedom to refrain from receipt of 
unwanted care and to refrain from paying for unwanted care).  The federal 
government need not ban exercise of a right before having to justify a burden on 
the exercise of it.  Rather, the federal government must satisfy heightened judicial 
scrutiny for imposition of a burden (here, an economic cost).  See U.S. v. Brandon, 
158 F.3d 947, 956 (6th Cir. 1998); Toledo Area AFL-CIO Council v. Pizza, 154 
F.3d 307, 321 (6th Cir. 1998).  It is undeniable that those who would prefer not to 
receive any medical care or any medical care covered by the PPACA (such as the 
individual Plaintiffs) are nevertheless forced to pay for the care they do not want.  
Health insurance, according to the customs and practices left unaffected by the 
PPACA, is for care paid forward. 
 The PPACA burdens the right of citizens to refuse unwanted medial care, a 
fundamental right, because it burdens the choice to refuse care and financially 
penalizes the refusal.  It burdens the right just as a tax on marriage or child rearing 
would influence constitutionally protected decisions and behavior.  Many federal 
 10
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regulations impose economic burdens, but not all such regulations burden the 
exercise of fundamental rights.  That is the distinction which eludes the 
government.  For example, a requirement that families reside in-state for five years 
before collecting welfare benefits is principally an economic measure; it imposes 
conditions on the receipt of funding,  See Barnes v. Board of Trustees, Mich. 
Veterans Trust Fund, 369 F.Supp. 1327, 1334 (W.D. Mich. 1973), yet the law also 
inescapably burdens the fundamental right to travel and is thus unconstitutional.  
Id.   
When the exercise of constitutional liberties are burdened by law, it is no 
excuse that the law also has an economic effect.  See Toledo Area AFL-CIO 
Council v. Pizza, 154 F.3d 307, 321 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[a]llowing the government to 
penalize conduct it cannot directly ban raises concerns that the government will be 
able to curtail by indirect means what the Constitution prohibits it from regulating 
directly”). Otherwise, Congress could legislate without limitation by citing 
economic incentives or consequences in every act.  Congress is not empowered to 
violate Constitutional rights whenever it premises legislation on an economic need.  
Moreover, it is undeniable that the primary aim of the PPACA’s individual 
mandate was not to raise revenue but to compel Americans to obtain health 
insurance so that they would have access to care Congress deemed appropriate.  In 
short, the measure was inextricably aimed at depriving individuals of their freedom 
 11
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to decline payment for unwanted care and not to raise revenue.  See Thomas More, 
--- F.3d ---, 2011 WL 2556039, *18 (“the central function of the mandate was not 
to raise revenue.  It was to change individual behavior by requiring all qualified 
Americans to obtain medical insurance”) (emphasis original).   
 The inquiry is whether the act burdens the free exercise of a fundamental 
right.  See, e.g., Toledo Area AFL-CIO Council, 154 F.3d at 321.  Whether that 
obstacle be a direct prohibition, economic penalty, or incentive, if the law burdens 
a fundamental right then it must pass strict scrutiny.  See U.S. v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 
947, 956 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[g]overnment action that burdens a fundamental right 
will survive a substantive due process challenge only if it can survive strict 
scrutiny, i.e., if it is narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest”).  
“Simply put, the government may not place obstacles in the path of a person’s 
exercise of a constitutionally protected right by impinging on the right absent a 
compelling justification.”  Toleda Area AFL-CIO Council, 154 F.3d at 321 
(quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 n.19 (1980)).   
 The PPACA’s minimum coverage provision erects obstacles to the exercise 
of citizens’ right to refuse medical care in two ways.  First, it penalizes citizens 
who refuse medical care by requiring payment for refused care (indeed, plaintiff 
Jim Grapek would refuse).  Second, the PPACA compels payment for government-
qualified medical care even when a citizen wishes not to receive such care.  Under 
 12
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the PPACA, citizens cannot refuse the burden of medical care.  They may refuse 
the physical procedure, but they cannot refuse the cost.  The right to refuse medical 
care must necessarily include the right to refuse payment for the care refused.  The 
federal government may not financially burden the exercise of a fundamental right.  
See Toledo Area AFL-CIO Council, 154 F.3d at 321; Brandon, 158 F.3d at 956  
 Moreover, by diminishing the finances of those who pay out-of-pocket for 
preferred, non-PPACA-covered, health care, the PPACA in a very real sense limits 
the freedom to dissent from receipt of unwanted care and the freedom to obtain 
receipt of wanted care.  That coercion violates the fundamental liberty right to 
refuse medical care.  PPACA-covered services are enumerated in Section 1302.  
All PPACA-compliant insurance packages must include coverage for, inter alia:  
mental health and substance use disorder services; prescription drugs; rehabilitative 
and habilitative services and devices; laboratory services; preventative and 
wellness services; and chronic disease management.  See 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1).  
Here, the premiums that flow to insurance companies for PPACA-compliant plans 
are to pay for the enumerated services.  Health insurance is medical care paid 
forward.  That concept is essential to the continuing operation of health insurance 
companies.  Premiums were customarily adjusted to fit the risk of treatment.  
Before PPACA, individuals obtained health insurance to cover payment for 
 13
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services the insured desired or intended to use (e.g., preventative wellness checks).  
Now, all citizens will pay for those services whether or not they ever use them.   
 The right or choice not to pay for medical treatment is inherent to the 
decision to refuse treatment.  Indeed, if a state enacted a tax on marriages between 
residents and non-residents, the tax would burden the right to marry, even if those 
affected decided to pay the tax and marry.  Here, the plaintiffs’ right to refuse 
payment stems from the exercise of their fundamental right to refuse medical 
treatment.  The penalty assessed on individuals for choosing one form of health 
care over government-qualified care burdens the right. 
 Finally, because the PPACA eliminates freedom of choice for all, and the 
facts necessary for a full adjudication are established, the plaintiffs’ facial 
challenge under the due process clause is proper.  See Washington State Grange v. 
Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449-50 (2008).  The primary 
concern with facial challenges is that the court should “be careful not to go beyond 
the statute’s facial requirements and speculate about ‘hypothetical’ or ‘imaginary’ 
cases.”  Id.; Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic, 517 U.S. 1174, 
1175 (1996) (Mem) (explaining that the “no circumstance” language concerning 
facial challenges in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) “does not 
accurately characterize the standard for deciding facial challenges”).  For example, 
in Washington State Grange, pre-enforcement review on a facial challenge was 
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inappropriate where Washington had not implemented the election law because the 
challenge depended on the “possibility that voters will be confused as to the 
meaning” of a ballot designation.  Id. at 454.  Here, the plaintiffs demonstrate an 
actual, not hypothetical, consequence caused by the PPACA’s individual mandate 
that impacts all United States citizens.  Appellant Jim Grapek’s sworn affidavit 
stated that he prefers complementary and alternative medicine not covered by 
traditional health insurance, and he would refuse certain traditional care.  See 
Appellants’ Brief, at 14-16 (citing Grapek Affidavit § 12).  The alternative 
therapies chosen by Mr. Grapek are not offered through PPACA-compliant plans 
and traditionally have not been covered by health insurance plans in the past.  See 
Appellants’ Br. at 14-16.  
The PPACA’s minimum coverage provision requires the compulsory 
purchase of specific medical care, funded through an insurance contract.  Many 
citizens may desire that coverage.  But each citizen loses his or her right to 
exercise freedom of choice in the receipt of care without financial burden.  The 
PPACA’s blanket application renders a due process challenge appropriate at this 
stage. 
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B. The Minimum Coverage Provision Substantially Burdens the 
Plaintiffs’ Fundamental Right to Associate with a Physician of 
Their Choosing 
 
 The Secretary argues that the right of intimate association does not 
encompass a citizen’s relationship with his or her doctor.  According to the 
Secretary, even if that relationship were protected, it would not be burdened by the 
PPACA.  See Appellees’ Br. at 18-20.  The Secretary is in error.  An individual’s 
relationship with a physician of his or her choosing includes all characteristics 
recognized by the Supreme Court for intimate association.  See Roberts v. U.S. 
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619, 620 (1984).  Moreover, the PPACA burdens that 
relationship by penalizing citizens who associate with alternative practitioners not 
covered by PPACA-compliant insurance contracts.  In addition, the PPACA limits 
citizens’ abilities to obtain medical care uninfluenced by the “third party” payer.  
Those burdens on the right to intimate association flow from the known and 
expected effects of PPACA.  
 The relationship between doctor and patient is supported through the 
constitutional rights to one’s bodily integrity and to refuse treatment.  See, e.g., 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113, 153-54 (1973); Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); Eisenstadt v. 
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Washington v. Harper, 494 US. 210, 222-23 (1990); 
Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299 (1982); Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278.  In Cruzan, 
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the Court connected the right of bodily integrity to the concept of informed 
consent: 
[N]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the 
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and 
control of his own person….  This notion of bodily integrity has been 
embodied in the requirement that informed consent is generally 
required for medical treatment. 
 
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269; Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 
(1891). 
 In Roberts, the Court defined “intimate associations” as those “distinguished 
by such attributes as relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decision to 
begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects of 
the relationship.”  Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620; see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 
173, 174-75 (1991).  A patient’s relationship with a physician of his or her 
choosing meets every one of those distinguishing characteristics.  The relationship 
is one-on-one association.  The patient carefully chooses a doctor based on skill, 
compassion, medical or ideological beliefs, and, most importantly, trust.  The 
relationship is deeply private, secluded from others.  Outside of marriage, there is 
likely no more intimate association than that between a doctor and a patient.  The 
patient shares intimate facts about his or her physical, mental, and social condition  
relevant to a clinical diagnosis; facts concerning body and mind so private that they 
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may not have been shared with spouses or family.  To the patient, the relationship 
is built upon trust.  The doctor receives the patient often in a vulnerable state.   
 For those reasons, courts have held the relationship between doctor and 
patient protected.  See Rust, 500 U.S. at 174-75 (“[i]t could be argued by analogy 
that traditional relationships such as that between doctor and patient should enjoy 
protection  under the First Amendment form Government regulation…”).  The 
Federal District Court for the Southern District of Texas held that decisions related 
to medical treatment are “to an extraordinary degree, intrinsically personal.”  
Andrews v. Ballard, 498 F.Supp. 1038, 1047 (S.D. Tex. 1980).  The Court 
continued, 
[I]t is the individual making the decision, and no one else, who, if he 
or she survives, must live with the results of that decision.  One’s 
health is a unique personal possession.  The decision of how to treat 
that possession is of no less personal nature. 
 
Id.  The patient’s trust in a practitioner to assist with those crucial decisions and 
treatment are among the most intimate, if not the most intimate, of those we 
encounter in life.   
The Secretary argues that “relationships with doctors” are not “the type 
protected by the freedom of intimate association.”  See Appellees’ Br. at 19 (citing 
Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psychology, 228 
F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 2000) (hereinafter “Psychoanalysis”).  The Secretary’s 
reliance on Psychoanalysis is misplaced, however, because that Court only had 
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occasion to explore where the doctor, not the patient, had a protected right in the 
relationship.  See Psychoanalysis, 228 F.3d at 1050.  Unlike patients, doctors 
cannot claim a right to associate with paying customers.  See id.; Hyman v. City of 
Louisville, 132 F.Supp. 2d 528, 543 (W.D.Ky. 2001), rev’d, 53 Fed. Appx. 740 
(6th Cir. 2002) (reversed for lack of standing).  By contrast, in this case, the 
patients’ right to choose is infringed.  Patients have no financial interest in the 
relationship.  Their interests are focused on receiving care from a trustworthy 
source.  The right to associate with trustworthy medical practitioners is a lifelong 
pursuit that only increases in importance with age.   
Moreover, in Psychoanalysis, the Court’s driving rationale was that 
substantive due process rights do not extend to the choice or type of a particular 
health care provider only when the “government has reasonably prohibited that 
type of treatment or provider.”  Psychoanalysis, 228 F.3d at 1050 (citing Mitchell 
v. Clayton, 995 F.2d 772, 775 (7th Cir. 1993).  In this case, the PPACA burdens 
citizens’ ability to access medical treatment and care that has not been deemed 
unsafe or unlawful.  Congress has simply erected obstacles to access that care, and 
those obstacles infringe on the protected relationship between a patient and his 
doctor. 
The protected relationship is burdened when financially penalized.  The 
Secretary argues that money is fungible, but that argument is belied by the fact that 
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here the government’s system works a coercive effect.  On the one hand, it is 
illegal not to associate with a private insurer who provides a PPACA-qualified plan 
and on the other, by electing to pay for care directly, the payer must finance two 
systems, the PPACA insurer and the physician not accepting insurance 
reimbursement.  That combination of penalty and compelled association with 
payment burdens Plaintiffs’ freedom to associate with practitioners of the 
Plaintiffs’ choosing and compels their association with health care providers the 
Plaintiffs wish to avoid.  The forced association on pain of federal penalty and 
outlaw status is an intended coercive mechanism in the statute that deprives 
Plaintiffs of their freedom of intimate association.   
For Plaintiff Jim Grapek, his annual health care budget is effectively 
doubled under the PPACA because (in addition to the unwelcomed burden of 
having to divulge his medical confidences to PPACA covered care providers), he 
must pay for the PPACA covered care he does not want while also financing the 
non-PPACA covered care he presently receives and desires.  See Appellants’ Br. at 
14-15; Grapek Affidavit ¶ 10 (R.E. 50-5).  Plaintiff Maurice Thompson contracts 
directly with physicians who do not accept insurance reimbursement because he 
does not want the third party insurance system second guessing the independent 
professional judgment of his preferred physician (so he can be assured of receiving 
the best quality care, regardless of its reimbursement status).  See Appellants’ Br. 
 20
Case: 11-3327     Document: 006111016927     Filed: 07/18/2011     Page: 25
at 13-14; Thompson Affidavit ¶ 10 (R.E. 50-6).  Plaintiff Thompson is thus also 
compelled to reduce his health care budget by the cost of PPACA insurance he 
does not want (and opposes on grounds of principle) as a penalty for the exercise 
of his right to continue contracting with his preferred physician who does not 
accept insurance reimbursement. 
Second, the PPACA compels an association with a health care system the 
Plaintiffs seek to avoid.  Health insurance is one of the largest expenses an average 
American household will incur.  See Appellants’ Br. at 17-18.  Purchasing health 
insurance creates an immediate association with a medical orthodoxy, including all 
in-network practitioners.  The right of intimate association also entails the right to 
be free from compulsory relationships of this kind.  See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623; 
see also Thomas S. by Brooks v. Flaherty, 699 F.Supp. 1178, 1203 (W.D.N.C. 
1988) (freedom of expressive association case that explained “the right [to freedom 
of association] includes freedom from state coerced association.  Even an indirect 
infringement on associational rights is impermissible and subject to the closest 
scrutiny”).  The PPACA creates a forced, ideologically objectionable private 
association for the Plaintiffs that requires dedication of the same funds which 
would ordinarily be reserved for health care of the Plaintiffs’ choosing.     
The Federal Government need not expressly eliminate the choice of CAM 
health care for the right to medical choice to be implicated.  The question is 
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whether the challenged statute effectively denies the right of privacy by “imposing 
a burden on,” or “significantly interfer[ing] with,” the citizen’s choice of 
association.  See Carey v. Population Services, Intern., 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977); 
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978).  The argument that American 
citizens can purchase alternative health care services of their choosing in addition 
to the government qualified care does not lessen the burden on citizens’ right of 
choice to purchase that health care in lieu of government qualified care.  See 
Andrews, 498 F.Supp. at 1041, 1051. 
 When government action burdens a fundamental right or protected 
relationship, it must pass heightened judicial scrutiny.  See U.S. v. Brandon, 158 
F.3d 947, 956 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[g]overnment action that burdens a fundamental 
right will survive a substantive due process challenge only if it can survive strict 
scrutiny, i.e., if it is narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest.”); 
Am. Booksellers Found. for Free Expression v. Strickland, 601 F.3d 622, 628 (6th 
Cir. 2010) (holding that “narrow tailoring” requires that the government act be the 
least restrictive means of promoting the compelling interest).  The PPACA is the 
broadest possible means and, so, it is unconstitutional.  Congress, for example, 
could have allowed citizens to seek exemptions from the PPACA based on 
independent medical coverage that was sufficient to meet certain standards.  If 
uncompensated care was the concern, Congress could have raised taxes to pay for 
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increased subsidies to hospitals that provide services as required under the 
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 
1395dd.  The PPACA provides no option to escape the mandate for those citizens 
who do not want to associate with PPACA qualified providers or receive the care a 
PPACA qualified plan offers.  The decision is foreclosed by the PPACA. 
C. The PPACA Burdens the Plaintiffs’ Fundamental Right of 
Expressive Association 
 
 The scope of protection afforded expression is broad.  See Boy Scouts of 
America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000).  The Secretary argues that citizens’ 
freedom of expression is not implicated by the PPACA because the Act does not 
prohibit expression, but the Act does compel private associations that advance an 
insured care model that the Plaintiffs oppose.  The promotion of insured private 
care is expressive activity, inasmuch as support for or opposition to abortion is 
ideological expression.  In this case, the Plaintiffs’ vocal support for direct 
payment for health care services and vocal opposition to insured care is 
undermined by the private association with and support for health insurance 
compelled by PPACA.  The PPACA requires the plaintiffs to associate with the 
same private health insurance companies that Plaintiffs oppose on ideological 
grounds.  The refusal is conduct.  Under the Court’s articulation of conduct in 
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), it should be “overly apparent” that a 
person choosing alternative medicine, or uninsured care, over conventional care 
 23
Case: 11-3327     Document: 006111016927     Filed: 07/18/2011     Page: 28
believes that the care chosen is more effective.  By paying health insurance, the 
plaintiffs would endorse the system they believe provides inferior quality of care 
and denies physicians independent professional judgment needed to ensure the best 
quality care.  Participation is antithetical to the Plaintiffs’ ideological view against 
this type of care. 
 The Secretary argues that the Court’s decision in Rumsfeld v. Forum for 
Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. (“FAIR”), 547 U.S. 47 (2006) is dispositive.  
See Appellees’ Br. at 21.  In FAIR, however the court explained a critical 
distinction: 
Recruiters are, by definition, outsiders who come onto campus for the 
limited purpose of trying to hire students—not to become members of 
the school’s expressive association.  This distinction is critical.  
Unlike the public accommodations law in Dale, the Solomon 
Amendment does not force a law school “to accept members it does 
not desire.” 
 
Id. at 69.  By contrast, the PPACA compels citizens to become dues-paying 
members in the system of third party health care, to ensure the survival and 
advancement of that system.  More than forcing citizens to maintain a “mere 
presence” in the system, the PPACA compels membership and participation.  See 
id. at 69, 70.  The FAIR analogy is well-suited to the instant case.  In FAIR, the 
Solomon Amendment could constitutionally allow military recruiters onto law 
school property for hiring purposes, but the law did not compel all students to 
attend interviews with military recruiters or to schedule such required interviews at 
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times when non-military recruiters were available to conduct interviews.  See id. at 
69-70.  Indeed, the PPACA forces Plaintiffs’ participation and replaces their 
opportunity to retain an exclusive association with the providers who do not accept 
insurance reimbursement who are their preferred providers.     
 
D. The Minimum Coverage Provision Violates the Plaintiffs’ Right 
to Privacy 
 
 The Secretary argues illogically that the PPACA does not require disclosure 
of medical information to insurance companies and health networks.  As the 
affidavits from insurance broker DiStefano and economist Shepherd-Bailey 
confirm, insurance companies depend on detailed health information concerning 
individual enrollees to ensure that the companies remain going concerns.  They 
must have that information to calculate risk management and margins and cannot 
function without that calculation.  See Appellants’ Br. at 53-43; DiStefano 
Affidavit at ¶¶ 7-9, 10 (R.E. 50-7); Report of Dr. Joanna M. Shepherd-Bailey at 
16-18 (R.E. 50-2).  An insurance company cannot determine whether to incur 
additional risk without an understanding of its current risk pool.  Plaintiffs offered 
substantial evidence before the District Court, including the expert report of an 
econometrician and a health insurance agent, demonstrating that companies will 
continue to require disclosure of medical information.  See Appellants’ Br. at 53-
43; DiStefano Affidavit at ¶¶ 7-9, 10 (R.E. 50-7); Report of Dr. Joanna M. 
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Shepherd-Bailey at 16-18 (R.E. 50-2).  Any suggestion that insurance companies 
will alter their informational needs absent a statutory command to do so is wishful 
thinking by the Secretary, counterintuitive speculation unsupported by fact. 
This appeal appears before the Court following a motion to dismiss.  The 
plaintiffs’ evidence should have been examined in a favorable light.  See Evans-
Marshall v. Board of Educ. of Tipp City Exempted Village School Dist., 428 F.3d 
223, 228 (6th Cir. 2005) (explaining that Court construes allegations in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
pleader); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Grawey v. Drury, 
567 F.3d 302, 310 (6th Cir. 2009) (stating that, on appeal, “[t]he Court’s de novo 
review must be based on the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff”).  There is nothing speculative about the impending disclosures under the 
law.  The PPACA does nothing to prevent insurance companies from seeking the 
detailed medical information they must have to remain in business.  Had Congress 
wished to deny insurers the ability to obtain that information, it would have been 
incumbent upon Congress to codify that change to the status quo.  Congress did 
not, and the Secretary of HHS through regulation has not.   
 Moreover, what Appellees argue are discrete, “legitimate” requests for 
medical information are, in fact, all-encompassing medical status inquiries.  See 
Appellees’ Br. at 22-23.  The Court analyzes forced disclosures of private 
 26
Case: 11-3327     Document: 006111016927     Filed: 07/18/2011     Page: 31
information under the two-step inquiry articulated in Bloch:  (1) the interest at 
stake must implicate a fundamental right or one implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty; and (2) the government’s interest in disseminating the information must be 
balanced against the individual’s interest in keeping the information private.”  
Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir. 1998).  Limited, so-called “legitimate” 
requests may satisfy the Bloch analysis because the government’s interest in 
disclosure outweighs the individual’s interest in keeping that information private.  
Thus, in Zuniga, the government’s need to investigate alleged schemes to defraud 
billings submitted to Michigan Blue Cross-Blue Shield outweighed the patients’s 
interests in keeping private their relationships with psychoanalysts.  In re Zuniga, 
714 F.2d 632, 634, 639-42 (6th Cir. 1983).2   
Zuniga demonstrates the risks inherent from insurance disclosures.  The 
Court held that the patients’ interest in privacy had been waived through the 
insurance contract:  
                                                 
2 Appellees cite NASA v. Nelson, 131 S.Ct. 746, 761-63 (2011) as a recent 
case that “rejected an informational privacy claim based in part on the protections 
against disclosure to the public.”  Appellees’ Br. at 22.  The NASA decision, 
however, is congruous with the Bloch test.  The NASA court struck a balance 
between the government’s interest in disclosure and the employees’ interest in 
privacy.  NASA, 131 S.Ct. at 759-60.  The Court held that the Government had an 
important interest in maintaining a reliable, law-abiding, efficient and effective 
workforce.  Id.  Knowing whether employees used illegal drugs was a useful 
means to assess those employees.  Id.  The interest in non-disclosure did not 
outweigh that government interest. 
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Even assuming arguendo that the identity of a patient and the times 
and dates of his treatment were within the scope of the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege, the patients in this case could not 
benefit from that privilege.  The patients in the case at bar have 
already disclosed their identities to a third party, i.e., Blue Cross/Blue 
Shield.  In doing so they have waived the privilege to the extent of 
their disclosure. 
 
Id. at 640.  Under Zuniga, therefore, the PPACA may eviscerate certain privileges 
and protections in medical information when such information is forcibly disclosed 
to third party insurance entities.  The Zuniga court further explained the degree of 
exposure for personal information disclosed to insurance companies and the risks 
thereof: 
In assenting to disclosure of these [insurance] documents, a 
reasonable patient would no doubt be aware that routine processing of 
reimbursement claims would require these records to be brought into 
the hands of numerous anonymous employees within a large 
corporation. While we might well have decided differently if the 
information sought under the subpoena involved detailed 
psychological profiles of patients or substantive accounts of therapy 
sessions, it cannot be said that the subsequent disclosure of such 
fragmentary data as is involved here as part of the insurance 
company's legal duties in assisting a federal criminal investigation 
would be beyond the contemplation of the patients' waiver. 
 
Id. at 640-41 (quoting In re Pebsworth, 705 F.2d 261, 262-63 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(emphasis added). 
 The disclosure of medical information compelled under the PPACA fails the 
Bloch test because the government’s interest in disseminating information does not 
outweigh the individuals’ interest in keeping the information private.  Bloch, 156 
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F.3d at 684.  The information required by insurance companies is sweeping, 
embracing the entire health status of a patient and is not for a limited, discrete 
purpose in service to a substantial or compelling governmental interest.  Congress 
has no interest in general health status disclosures to private insurance companies.  
Although insurance companies demand medical information from enrollees, 
the Secretary argues that the PPACA does not directly compel the disclosure.  See 
Appellees’ Br. at 22-23.  To make that argument, the Secretary must also argue 
that Congress did not expressly intend for the PPACA to function through the 
disclosure of sensitive medical information.  Id. at 22 (suggesting that because “the 
Affordable Care Act will bar insurance companies from denying coverage or 
setting premiums on the basis of an individual’s medical condition or history,” then 
those insurance companies will refrain from seeking that information).  It defies 
credulity to argue that Congress, aware of the common insurance practice of 
requiring health status information would leave that practice in place yet expect it 
to be eliminated in practice.  Neither Congress nor the Secretary of HHS has 
proposed elimination of the common practice and procedure of insurance 
companies to compel all enrollees to divulge their health status information.  
Indeed, to determine which enrollees are pose high insurance risks and are 
candidates for the reinsurance programs, 42 U.S.C. § 18061, insurance companies 
must routinely evaluate health status of all enrollees.  Congress made no findings 
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suggesting that disclosures were necessary to the operation of the PPACA such 
that an alternative constitutional approach could not be codified. 
Congress could have placed in the PPACA limits on information required to 
be disclosed to companies in an insurance application or over the course of the 
relationship.  It did not do so.  Under the Secretary’s argument, if the Act could 
operate in the same fashion without disclosure of medical information, then 
Congress has no basis to compel disclosure in the first instance.  If the government 
has no reasoned basis for requiring disclosure of medical information, or at least 
preventing disclosure in the normal course of a now compulsory relationship, then 
the government cannot meet the Bloch test.  Any individual interest in maintaining 
privacy will overcome the government’s non-interest.  
 The plaintiffs-appellants have demonstrated a protected interest in 
maintaining the privacy of their medical information from disclosure to, inter alia, 
“the hands of numerous anonymous employees within a large corporation.”  In re 
Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 640-41.  That protected interest outweighs the government’s 
interest in disclosure and, therefore, the PPACA unconstitutionally abridges the 
plaintiffs’ right to privacy. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
For foregoing reasons, Appellants’ respectfully request that this Court 
reverse the District Court, declare the PPACA’s Individual Mandate 
unconstitutional, and enjoin its enforcement. 
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